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“The Father of Cartesian Empiricism: Robert Desgabets on the physics 
and metaphysics of blood transfusion”


	Some forty years or so after the publication of Harvey’s work on blood circulation, De Motu Cordis,​[1]​ came the first allegedly successful transfusion of blood into a human subject (from a sheep) by the French physician Jean Denis, followed shortly thereafter in 1670 by the official French order to prohibit any further such procedures.  In between, English physician Christopher Wren experimented with infusion or injection from animal to animal, and his colleague Richard Lower, using a method of transfusion, reportedly had success transfusing from dog to dog, sometime around 1665. To my knowledge, no standard medical or scientific history discusses any activities in France prior to mention of the failed experiments of Jean Denis in 1667.​[2]​ The subject of neglect in this history is Robert Desgabets (1610-1678), an early defender and teacher of the Cartesian philosophy at St. Maur, in the region of Lorraine, France.  
Desgabets’ Discourse de la communication ou transfusion du sang contains a defence and description of the procedure of blood transfusion.​[3]​  This short work was the basis for a lecture Desgabets delivered at one of the regular meetings held at the Paris residence of M. de Montmor in July 1658. ​[4]​ His interest in blood transfusion can be traced back to 1650 at Saint Arnold de Metz, where he taught philosophy.​[5]​ It is unlikely that Desgabets performed experiments on blood transfusion but he did provide a framework to conceptualize and justify the procedure, and he designed an apparatus that he had made by a M. Picot in 1660.​[6]​ In this paper I provide a brief background for Desgabets’ approach to scientific and theological questions alike, domains that he believed Descartes’ discoveries in mathematics and physics had at last brought together. I argue that the Cartesian conceptions of matter and mechanism along with a development of the Cartesian method in the direction of empiricism, provide the tools for reform that Desgabets envisioned in science, philosophy, and theology. Echoing Descartes remarks in Part VI of the Discourse on Method, the role of experiment was to provide demonstrations of the first principles or truths of physics and theology by connecting them to the way God actually made the world.  The upshot of Desgabets’ treatment of expérience is that it is integral to the knowledge of essences, and hence to the discovery of the truth of things.  In placing expérience at the very foundation of true knowledge, Desgabets reconstructs Cartesian science and Cartesianism proper on an empiricist foundation.


Section I:  The Background to Cartesian Science and Theology
	I should begin with a few words about the life and writings of Dom Robert Desgabets (1610-1678). He was an early defender and teacher of the Cartesian philosophy at St. Maur, in the region of Lorraine, France.  He belonged to the Benedictine congregations of Saint Vanne and Saint Hydulphe, known for their spirit of reform and love for science.​[7]​ Though Desgabets is little known today, he played a significant part in the Cartesian world from 1660-1678, especially in the Eucharist affair, which began shortly after Descartes' death.​[8]​  According to Mouy, he was converted to Cartesianism while reading Descartes' Discours de la Méthode, and he believed that Descartes’ principles could provide a solid base for theology.​[9]​ Desgabets was especi​ally assoc​iated with the Cartesians at Paris and Toulouse, through Clerselier,​[10]​ and his student, Pierre-Sylvain Régis.​[11]​ Though he is perhaps the most original of the Cartesian thinkers, even lauded by Régis, as “one of the greatest metaphysicians of our century,”​[12]​ only one book​[13]​ and two small works​[14]​ were published during his life​time.​[15]​  His correspondence indicates that he was interested in mech​anics before 1644, well before being acquainted with Descartes.​[16]​ In Desgabets’ estim​a​tion, the only legitimate rival system to Descartes’ was the one developed by Pierre Gassendi, but in the final analysis, the nouvelles découvertes weighed decisively in Descartes’ favour.​[17]​ 
	It was in 1654, upon appeal from Clerselier, that Desgabets entered into the Cartesian debate concerning the Euchar​ist. This debate was initiated by an August​inian, Viogué,​[18]​ who wrote to Clerselier shortly after Descartes’ death concerning the Cartesian explanation of transubstantiation.  Given the Cartesian view that the essence of matter is extension, Viogué want​ed to know how the real presence of Christ in the Holy Sacrament could be explicated without the aid of accidents.  Clerselier's response was counter-attacked by the French physician Pastel, at which point Clerselier related the corres​pondence to “a very learned Bene​dictine,” Dom Robert Desgabets.​[19]​  Another player in this debate was a friend of Clerselier's, the physician Denis of Tours, who re-emerges in the controversy over Desgabets’ role in the invention of blood transfusion.  Denis advised Clerselier to dist​ing​uish between natural events and mira​culous events, the latter of which, he claimed, escaped natural explanation. Clerselier was dis​satisfied with this solution, since Cartesianism was meant to provide a complete explanation of the world, and hence should provide some basis for explic​ating the mystery of the Eucharist.  Desgabets also found Denis’ solution, and that of the Scotists, which called for the annihi​lation of one substance and the creation of another, completely unaccept​able.   
	The short story of Desgabets’ role in the Eucharist Controversy is that he argued that the Scholastic doctrines of real presence and transubstantiation were erroneous and could be cleared up by the reformation that had taken place in philosophy by “its joining with mathematics.”​[20]​ The Scholastic doctrine, as found in Aquinas, has it that the soul of Christ unites with the matter of the bread, annihilating the substance of the bread and creating the matter of the body of Christ in its place. The appearance of the bread and the body of Christ could be explained by appeal to accidents. Transubstantiation achieves the real presence of Christ in the host by the annihilation of one substance (the bread) for another (the body of Christ). Desgabets urged his fellow clergymen to consider Descartes’ account of the nature of material substance against that of the Scholastics. The advantage of Descartes’ theory is that the mystery of the Eucharist could be explained without appealing to the creation and annihilation ex nihilo of substances or the phantom of accidents. Desgabets reasoned as follows: (1) matter just is extension and is not really distinct from quantity; (2) there are no substantial material forms, just the local dispositions of insensible parts of matter; (3) therefore, after the consecration of the Holy Sacrament we have the same quantity of matter we had before it, what has changed is that Christ’s soul is now united to the specific local dispositions once belonging to the bread. What has transpired is not the annihilation of substances, just the destruction of one modal being (the bread) for another (the body of Christ). In this way, Desgabets proposed to explain the real presence of Christ in the host in keeping with the Cartesian conception of matter. Desgabets took the reformation Descartes effected in physics to be one that could be brought about in theology—a reform that promised to unite the Lutherans, Calvinists, and Pelagians.​[21]​ It was a solution that ran counter to official church doctrine however. It angered many, including Arnauld, who along with Nicole, was responsible for exposing Desgabets as the author of the Considérations sur l'état présent de la controverse.​[22]​ The culmination of the Eucharist Controversy for Desgabets was an interrogation by his superiors and the suppression of his future writings.​[23]​




Cartesian Science:  The Metaphysics and Physics of Body
There are two key features of Descartes’ physics that captivated Desgabets’ imagination: universal mechanism and the geometrical conception of body.  Cartesian mechanism was the idea that the behavior of physical bodies, including human ones, could be completely understood in terms of the shapes and configurations of their parts and their functions depended upon movement alone.​[32]​  If nature could be studied as a kind of machine then the principles of mechanics should explain all physical phenomena—from the movements of the planets, to the movement of blood through the human body, to the movement of the blood and body of Christ into the wine and host of the Eucharist. 
The second feature of significance for Desgabets’ adoption of the Cartesian physics is Descartes’ geometrical conception of body. According to the Cartesian conception of matter, a body is an extended thing.  The essence of body, according to Descartes is extension, which is just to say that body can be understood solely and completely in terms of its extension in three dimensions, and its properties, which include size, shape, and motion. 
What Desgabets saw as particularly significant about Descartes’ conception of matter was that the physical magnitude that physicists study is the same as the geometrical magnitude that geometers study.  This meant that the non-geometrical sensible qualities, such as tastes, colors, sounds, heat, cold, were qualities that did not belong to body.  Rather, sensible qualities, according to Descartes’ metaphysics, belong to mind.  Thus, Descartes claimed that body just is extension and the properties that follow from it, namely, size, shape, position, rest, local motion.  These properties are not only the essential properties of body but also the only properties of body. 
Descartes’ Universal Mechanism and geometrical conception of body provided a powerful framework for the scientific study and analysis of physical phenomena that was to have many consequences and applications. We’ve seen how Desgabets applied these to theological problem of real presence, let’s turn to his application of this in the scientific realm, specifically blood transfusion. 

The Science and History of Blood Transfusion
	Desgabets credits Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of blood—that blood is pumped by the heart through the arteries and back again through the veins—as that which permitted him to view the flow of blood as a species of the communication of movement.  Since Harvey himself did not view blood flow quite in this way, we need look no further than Descartes’ conception of mechanism to complete the picture. In Discourse V, Descartes compares the movement of blood with the movement found in a clock, and concludes that the movement found in each follows necessarily from the disposition, situation and shape of its parts.  We need only suppose the laws of mechanics in order to explain how the various particles of blood move.  Desgabets was persuaded by Descartes’ view of animals and human bodies as highly delicate and organized machines.  According to Desgabets, the operation of the laws of nature in the form of rules for the communication of movement was the true and unique foundation of the new physics.  This was the route by which Desgabets arrived at the idea of blood transfusion.  Simply put, if blood circulation is a species of the communication of movement, it should be possible, and potentially beneficial as a remedy to diseases of the blood, to move, that is transfuse, blood from one body into another.  

Desgabets on Blood Transfusion
	In 1658, Desgabets presented his research on blood transfusion at a Cartesian conference in Paris, but its contents were not published until 1668.​[33]​ The presentation is entitled “Discourse on the Communication or Transfusion of Blood” and begins as follows:
By communication of blood I mean the effective passage of blood from a healthy man or animal into the veins of a weak or sick man.  This seems possible to do without any bad consequences and with considerable benefits for the future provided it is practiced with care and precaution. ​[34]​


From there, he sets out to accomplish three things in his discourse, which we will take in turn:

1)  The first point is to describe how such a thing as the communication or transfusion of blood is possible.

2) The second point is to describe how it can be done without peril to the subjects of the procedure.

3) And finally, to prove that it can be practised with great benefits.

With regard to the first point, that is, regarding the possibility of such an operation, Desgabets says that from the discovery of the constant circulation of blood, we know that if a vein were to be opened beneath a ligature and a small tube were inserted there, any foreign blood which is forced into the tube would enter the vein and return to the heart by an extraordinary path and from there would pass into the arteries and be distri​buted to the rest of the body.  Thus the communication of blood is made possible by the fact that blood moves in a circulatory and regular manner. 
Still on the first point, he says that with respect to how this communication could be effected, he says:
The machine that I imagine for this operation is simple and consists only of two small silver tubes, one whose end is open like a trumpet for its gentle application against the vessels that must give the blood; and the other is of a thickness proper to the insertion into the opening of the vein.  The other two ends of the tubes communicate together by means of a small leather pouch of the thickness of a walnut, which serves three functions.

(Desgabets reports in the extracted letter to Denis preceding this discourse that Abbé Picot constructed the mechanism sometime around 1660, but it is not clear whether it was this apparatus used by Jean Denis in his experiments.)

Next, Desgabets moves on to his second point, which is to give a defence of the procedure, as one that can be done without peril to the subjects of the operation.  Here, Desgabets addresses the specifics of the procedure relative to the requirements of the patients involved:
1) the new blood transfused into the patient all at once may cause a significant alteration.  This can be avoided if only a small amount of new blood is transfused at one time, and instead, the procedure is repeated over several days.

2) the blood must be communicated without air and without effusions (bloodshed), and the veins and arteries should be treated as vessels for carrying blood which are no more endowed with faculties than the silver tubes themselves.

3) because blood does not communicate with the external air at all, it should not be cooled; and if it should be cooled somehow, it could be prevented easily with warm linens.

4) it is often objected that the diversity of complex​ions should preclude this operation from being performed, but there is a way to remedy this by carefully choosing the donors; By analogy, just as we must be careful of what we ingest by the mouth -- there being an infinite number of elements of different qualities and quantities which are potentially dangerous, we must be careful in our choice of quality and quantity with regard to what we take in by transfusion. 
	
To summarize, Desgabets recognized that blood should be transfused gradually, that air must not be allowed to mix with the transfused blood and must be kept at a warm temperature; and finally, that too much new blood or not enough could be toxic or poisonous to the recipient.
This brings us to Desgabets third point and final discussion of the Discourse, which concerns the purpose of blood transfusion.  In this section, Desgabets argues that blood transfusion has many potential fruits to bear for the betterment of human life:
Everyone agrees that nearly all that is good and bad in the body depends on the blood; which, when balanced and tempered it is impossible that one not be in perfect health; and to the contrary, when altered, one losses one's health and sometimes life.  Thus, there are many cases in which this operation should be employed:  The first such cause is when the vital forces leave a man whether by the loss of blood, sickness or old age; if one judges it properly the body can be restored to good temper, so long as a good choice of a donor is made, since this serves to re-establish nature, retard aging and make life longer and happier.  The other case is to cure sicknesses that are caused by the intemperance of the blood itself or its insufficient quantity.​[35]​

Desgabets then gives a specific example to illustrate the application of the procedure in such a case:  
… if before the viscera become blocked, we were to give a Hydropic [one suffering from extensive bodily swelling], new blood in place of the old blood from the veins, which have hardly any vital heat, there would be a great recovery of his forces and his health.   

This is the note upon which Desgabets ends his Discourse, with a specific application of blood transfusion as a remedy for some types of diseases or conditions.     
Thus, Desgabets viewed the procedure of blood transfusion as a specific application of Cartesian physics aimed at the betterment of human life.  He provided a scientific framework, a procedure, the design of an apparatus, and a rationale for blood transfusion. He directly inspired the experiments and work of Jean Denis whose failures do not diminish the significance of their place in the history of science or of Cartesian science. Rather, it highlights the extent to which the Cartesians of the period were influenced by Descartes to model the human body after a machine and to perform experiments to test the nature of its workings.
	
Cartesian Empiricism
	I would be remiss if I did not address the question of what is meant here by Cartesian empiricism and why I name Desgabets as its father. Monte Cooke notes the long tradition of regarding him as such  “ … from Cousin and Bouillier to Rodis-Lewis, Easton, and Lennon.”​[36]​ Cook raises an important challenge to the empiricist reading, one that Allen-Hermanson has responded to at length, and to which I can only briefly comment here. ​[37]​  The upshot of my position is that Desgabets was an empiricist in all the important senses of that term: Desgabets’ empirical research, most notably his work on blood transfusion, his conception of the contingent nature of the eternal truths and material bodies, his rejection of hyperbolic doubt and pure intellection, and his insistence on the necessary role of sensible signs in the formation of all ideas, each testify to the essential and necessary role he saw for expérience.  In fact, I claim that the essential role Desgabets assigns to expérience is not merely consequential but integral to his system.​[38]​ 
	 The crux of Cook’s challenge is that although Desgabets repeatedly asserts and argues for the view that all thoughts depend on body, this sense of dependence is purely causal and metaphysical whereby the body acts as the occasion for our imaginations and intellections, but does not provide the representation or object of those thoughts. Cook rightly and pointedly challenges the empiricist reading to show that the senses provide more than a causal concomitance for thought. Sean Allen-Hermanson proposes that Desgabets’ conception of simple conception is one rooted in perception and conscious experience.​[39]​ Our simple conceptions proceed from our senses and precede judgment and hence error, and as such they provide the basis for all our ideas and knowledge. He observes that “Desgabets appears to be a content empiricist who offers an early sense-data theory, motivated by anti-skepticism.” ​[40]​ I am largely in agreement with Allen-Hermanson’s view, but Desgabets’ theory of ideas is a complicated one, so I want take another tact here. My response to Cook’s challenge focuses on Desgabets’ view of the role of experience in scientific method. The senses play much more than just a causal role in the generation of truths.
	Recall Desgabets’ appeal to Descartes’ reformation in philosophy as rooted in the idea that mathematics and physics are at long last joined. Although the mathematicians and physicists study the same “object”, i.e., physical magnitude, physicists consider it not as it is in itself, but as it relates to its modes of being.  In other words, physics studies particular extended bodies whereas mathematicians study extension itself. Rather than assimilate physics to mathematics in order to make it more certain, Desgabets actually offers a materialist foundation for mathematics.
	It is the senses not reason that present us with matter as it exists at a particular place and moment. A purely a priori physics would not only be incomplete but impossible because reasoning itself cannot provide all the actual artifices and compositions of matter. In order to know the actual artifices and composi​tions of matter, we must have recourse to sensible qualities, which are nothing but the local dispositions of matter as compre​hended by the mind.  These are the mind's tie to the movements of body, and thus, the actual compositions of matter, and so are equally a part of the object of physics and mathematics:
. . . these modes of matter, or these sensible qualities, are obviously part of the proper object of mathematics and mechanics because there is no question here but of the sizes, movements, rest, figures and arrangements of the parts of matter, and what can result from their assemblage and combination, and in all of this there is nothing that is not governed by the laws of mechanics.  It is upon this truth that the happy reunion of physics and mathematics is made in our day.​[41]​
 
Thus physics or mechanics must “look to expérience which operates by the senses, rather than by reasoning.”​[42]​  It is expérience that puts us in contact with the modes of matter, which would otherwise be unknowable.  
	Desgabets meant more than that the senses merely put us in contact with the modes of matter, he meant that they are conveyors of truth. In his writing against the skeptic Simon Foucher, Desgabets distances himself from Malebranche on the question of the role of the senses in the search after truth:
… you have perhaps followed the author of the Search, who has absolutely declared himself against the use of the senses to know the truth.  Nevertheless, as often as the senses make us perceive what is in fact in external things, we are right to say then that those things are the objects of the senses.  Thus when they [the senses] act on us and we think of body, of movement, of rest, of figure, of arrangement of parts, and of all that can result from their assemblage, all of that is the object of a distinct knowledge and of a very pure intellection that the senses gives us, and we have an idea of it as clear as any other thing whatever it should be.​[43]​
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